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1 Introduction
Most regional and international regimes—systems in which national governments yield
power to a supranational authority that grants member nations rights and imposes
obligations on them—emerge from crisis. For example, after wars end, security regimes
are often created: nations pledge mutual support via NATO and similar organizations to
prevent or deal with future conflicts. Similarly, economic crises may be followed by
trade regimes that require member states to lower barriers to goods from all member
nations, as with the WTO. Finally, there can be financial regimes, such as the IMF
establishing rules for fiscal and monetary policies before providing loans to
governments.
Defence regimes are based on the expectation that mutual benefits will flow from peace,
while economic regimes assume there will be increased output from comparative
advantage and stable economic policies. The economic case for an international
migration regime is weaker, and that established to deal with refugees struggled with a
rising number of asylum applicants in the 1990s.1 Most calls for an international
migration regime imagine a system in which there would be fewer barriers to movement
over national borders, and thus more migration. There are several speculative estimates
of the gains from more international migration based on increased allocative
efficiency—moving labour from lower to higher wage areas, with the wage gain
reflecting the economic gain. Hamilton and Whaley, in a 1984 general equilibrium
modelling exercise, estimated that world GDP could double if barriers to labour
migration were removed.
In a more incremental approach to estimating the gains from more migration, the 1992
UNDP Human Development Report estimated that, if an additional two per cent of the
2.5 billion strong labour force of developing countries were permitted to move to
industrial countries, which means an additional 50 million migrants, and they earned an
average US$ 5,000 a year or a total US$ 250 billion, and remitted 20 per cent of their
earnings or US$ 50 billion a year to their countries of origin, the extra remittances to
their countries of origin would be equivalent to official development assistance.
According to the latest UN Population Division data, in 2000 there were about 185
million international migrants—persons outside their country of birth or citizenship for
12 months or more, up from 120 million in 1990. Some 70 to 80 million of the world’s
migrants are in industrial countries,2 so adding 50 million migrants—all in the
developed countries—would almost double their number of migrants, and affect labour
markets, employment patterns and wages in sending and receiving nations. The US has
                                                
1 The 1951 Geneva Convention on refugees obliges signatory countries not to refoul or return to danger
persons who are outside their countries because of a well-founded fear of persecution because of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. As the number of
asylum seekers—foreigners who arrived in industrial countries and asked not to be returned because
they faced persecution at home—rose in the 1990s, the industrial countries spent an estimated US$ 10
billion a year to care for and process asylum seekers. Members of the EU have been struggling with
the challenge of developing common standards and criteria for evaluating and handling applicants as
well as for ‘burden-sharing’, sharing the cost of processing asylum applications and supporting
applicants while they await a decision.
2 The UN estimate is 150 to 200 million migrants in 2000. There is no country or regional breakdown,
but in 1990, when the UN estimated 120 million migrants, 66 million or 55 per cent were in
developing countries and 54 million or 45 per cent were in developed countries.2
about 32 million foreign-born residents, including 15 million in the labour force, and
their presence is estimated to add up to US$ 10 billion to the US$ 10 trillion GDP, or
1/10 of one per cent, largely via wage depression. The sign of the migrant economic
effect is positive, but its magnitude is small.
The labour force participation rates of migrants are lower in Europe. If we assume that
migrants in all the industrial countries, which have a GDP of US$ 25 trillion, currently
add 1/10 of one per cent to GDP, the migrant gain is US$ 25 billion a year. If doubling
the number of migrants doubled the gain, it would be US$ 50 billion a year. Adding
US$ 50 billion to the GDP of industrial countries is about equivalent to their current
ODA to developing countries. To put US$ 50 billion in perspective, if industrial country
GDP grows by 2 per cent a year, it rises by US$ 500 billion, which means that doubling
the number of migrants in the industrial countries has an economic impact equivalent of
about one month’s ‘normal’ growth.
These data suggest that the economic gains from current levels of immigration are
relatively small, and that even a doubling of current levels would not dramatically add
to growth. As with most economic activities, increasing migration highlights
competition between competing goods—a faster rising GDP may be coupled with more
unemployment and/or inequality, ceteris paribus, for workers who compete with the
additional migrants. Without social safety nets for such workers which are rare
compared in comparison to Trade Adjustment Assistance programmes for workers
displaced by freer trade, these workers can be worse off, and social discontent could
result. Furthermore, the process of admitting and integrating additional migrants can be
costly.
We focus on the dynamics of change in two migration regimes: Mexico-US migration
in the 1990s, especially after NAFTA went into effect 1 January 1994, and migration
from eastern to western Europe in the 1990s, with a special emphasis on likely east-west
migration after Poland and other eastern and southern European countries become full
EU members with freedom of movement rights. We conclude that it is easy to
exaggerate the benefits and costs of migration. Economic integration is desirable for its
own sake, and we conclude that the additional migration that sometimes accompanies
economic integration is a ‘reasonable price to pay’ for the increased economic
efficiency flowing from trade and investment that responds to comparative advantage.
However, it is less clear that moving ex-farmers and their children over borders after
they are displaced by economic integration is better than re-integrating them into
growing home country economies and labour markets.
Table 1
UN Estimates of global migrants, 1965-2000
Migrants (millions) World population (billions) Migrant %
1965 75 3.3 2.3
1975 85 4.1 2.1
1985 105 4.8 2.2
1995 148 5.7 2.6
2000 185 6.1 3.0
Source: UN Population Division.3
2 Thinking about migration
Migration is as old as humans wandering in search of food, but international migration
is a relatively recent phenomenon: it was only in the early twentieth century that the
system of nation-states, passports, and visas developed to regulate the flow of people
across borders. Migration is the exception, not the rule, for two major reasons. The first
and most powerful is inertia: most people lack the desire and drive to leave home and
move away from family and friends. The second is the restriction of movement across
national borders. Governments have significant capacity to regulate migration through
passports, visas, and border controls.
The growth in the number of nation-states increases opportunities for international
migration. There were 190 recognized nation-states in 2000, up from 43 in 1900, and
each has a system of passports to distinguish citizens from foreigners, border controls to
inspect persons who want to enter, and policies that affect the settlement and integration
of noncitizens. Most countries do not anticipate the arrival of foreigners who wish to
settle and become naturalized citizens, and some discourage emigration.
There are just five major immigration countries: the United States, Canada, Australia,
Israel, and New Zealand. Collectively these countries accept 1.2 million immigrants a
year. About 800,000 immigrants each year are officially admitted to the United States;
200,000 to Canada; 75,000 to Australia; 50,000 to Israel; and 35,000 to New Zealand.
But these figures account for a small percentage of the estimated annual global
immigration, which means that most people who take up residence in another country
each year are not accepted as ‘planned immigrants’. Instead, many foreigners move to
join family members abroad or seek asylum, are guest workers who are expected to
depart after several years of work, or are unauthorized or illegal foreigners who enter
and settle in defiance of immigration laws.
International migration is usually a major individual or family decision that is carefully
considered. There are two broad categories of migrants: those who decided to migrate to
another country for primarily economic reasons, and those who moved primarily for
noneconomic reasons (see Table 2). The factors that encourage a migrant to actually
move are grouped into three categories: demand-pull, supply-push, and network factors.
Economic migrants may, for example, be encouraged to migrate by demand-pull guest
worker recruitment, while noneconomic migrants might be motivated to cross borders to
join family members settled abroad. A man living in rural Mexico, for example, may be
offered a job in the United States by a recruiter, or hear about US job openings on the
radio—a demand-pull factor. This potential migrant may not have a job at home, or he
may face crop failures, which make him willing to move, a supply-push factor. After
obtaining information about US work and wages from a returned migrant, a network
factor, he decides to migrate from Mexico to the United States.
The three factors encouraging an individual to migrate do not have equal weights, and
the weight of each factor can change over time. Generally, demand-pull and supply-
push factors are strongest at the beginnings of a migration flow, and network factors
become more important as the migration stream matures. Thus, the first guest workers
are recruited, often in rural areas where jobs are scarce. But after migrants return with
information about job opportunities abroad, network factors may become more
important in sustaining migration, so that even employed workers in Mexico may
migrate to the United States for higher wages.4
Table 2
Determinants of migration: Factors encouraging an individual to migrate
Type of migrant Demand-pull Supply-push Network/other
Economic Labour recruitment, e.g.
guest workers
Un- or under-employment;
low wages; e.g., farmers
whose crops fail
Job and wage information
flows; e.g., sons following
fathers
Noneconomic Family unification; e.g.,
family members join spouse
Flee war and persecution;






These examples are illustrative. Individuals contemplating migration may be
encouraged to move by one, two, or all three factors. The importance of pull, push, and
network factors can change over time.
One of the most important noneconomic motivations for crossing national borders is
family unification—a father working abroad wants to have his wife and children join
him, for example. In such cases, the anchor immigrant is a demand-pull factor for
family chain migration. The migrant’s immediate family may be followed by brothers
and sisters, and then their families.
Some migrants are impelled to cross national borders by war and political persecution at
home. Some of these migrants qualify as refugees according to the 1951 Geneva
Convention which defines a refugee as a person residing outside his or her country of
citizenship who is unwilling or unable to return because of ‘a well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion’. Countries that signed the Geneva Convention pledged not to
‘refoul’ or return persons to places where they could be persecuted.
Migration is a result of differences: in demographic growth, in incomes, and in security
and human rights. These differences are increasing, so international migration is likely
to increase in the twenty-first century. A comparison of the demographic evolution of
Europe and Africa is instructive. In 1800, Europe had about 20 per cent of world’s one
billion people and Africa had 8 per cent. In 2000, the populations of these two
continents were almost equal—Europe had 728 million residents and Africa 800
million, giving each 12-13 per cent of the world’s population. If current trends continue,
Europe will shrink to 660 million by 2050, or about 7 per cent of the world’s nine
billion residents, while Africa will expand to 1.8 billion, 20 per cent of the world’s
residents. Demographic trends north and south of the Mediterranean raise a migration
question: Will Africans migrate northward, to a Europe that may have ‘excess’
infrastructure and housing for a smaller population? History suggests the answer will be
yes—some 60 million Europeans emigrated from a more densely settled Europe to the
Americas and Oceania between 1800 and 1915. The issue for Europe and Africa will be
how to manage what appears to be an inevitable south-north migration.
Economic trends provide a second example of differences that are likely to increase
potential migration. The world’s GDP was US$ 30 trillion in 2000, and is expected to
double by 2030. Economic growth is expected to be fastest in developing countries, but
higher incomes in the industrial democracies mean that many young people in5
developing countries will be able to earn in one hour abroad the equivalent of a day’s
wages at home. According to the World Bank, global per capita income averages
US$  5,000, but per capita incomes in the 25 high-income countries averaged
US$ 26,000 per person in 1999, and US$ 1,200 in the poorer 175 countries. This means
that an average person moving from a poorer to a high-income country can increase her
income 22 times; this large income gap explains why migrants often take huge risks to
enter high-income countries.
There is a second dimension to economic differences between high-income and poorer
countries that suggests increased international labour migration in the twenty-first
century. The world’s labour force in 1999 was 2.9 million, and 1.3 million or 45 per
cent of the world’s workers were employed in agriculture. In developing countries,
incomes in agriculture are generally lower than in urban areas.3 There is a ‘great
migration’ off the land underway in many developing countries that are integral
components of the world migration system, including China, Mexico, and Turkey, and
this great migration will likely continue in the twenty-first century, with three
implications:
−   First, ex-farmers everywhere are most likely to accept so-called 3-D jobs (dirty,
dangerous, difficult) in urban areas inside their countries or abroad, as seen in
Chinese coastal cities, where internal migrants fill 3-D jobs, and abroad, where
Chinese migrants are employed in industries that range from services to
sweatshops;
−   Second, ex-farmers who must find new jobs and sources of income, often make
physical as well as cultural transitions when they leave rural areas, making them
more willing to go overseas if there is recruitment or a migration infrastructure
that can help them to cross borders;
−   Third, cities in developing countries have become nodes in the international
migration infrastructure—cities are the places to which migrants go to get visas
and documents for legal migration, or to make arrangements for illegal migration.
Demographic and economic differences, augmented by the flight from the land in
developing nations, promise more migration in the twenty-first century. The third major
difference that promises more international migration involves security and human
rights. As global conflicts such as the fight between capitalism and communism ended
in the 1990s, local conflicts erupted in many areas, leading to separatist movements,
new nations, and migration, as in the ex-USSR and ex-Yugoslavia. As the process of
nation-state creation continues, there were 43 generally recognized nation-states in
1900, 121 in 1980, and 193 in 1998. In most cases, creating new nation-states leads to a
reshuffling of population, as in South Asia and Europe after World War II. However, in
some cases, the creation of nation-states can produce migrants without physical
movement, as with Russians in the Baltics who were considered to be foreigners in
Latvia or Estonia. The creation of migrants as borders move over people may become
more common as independence movements spread in, for example, Indonesia.
                                                
3 This income gap encourages rural-urban migration, helping to explain why there are shanty towns
around many cities in developing countries and why the urban population of the low and middle
income countries rose from 32 to 41 per cent of these countries’ population between 1980 and 1999.6
3 Evolution of Mexico-US migration
The largest volume migration relationship in the world has moved about nine million of
the 109 million persons born in Mexico to the US, half since 1990; an additional 1-2
million Mexicans work seasonally in the US. There are about 15 million foreign-born
workers in the US labour force of 142 million, including 5-6 million Mexican-born
workers, most in formal sector jobs.
Mexico has a labour force of about 40 million, but many of those considered employed
in Mexico are self-employed farmers, unpaid family workers, or in the informal
sector—the usual indicator of formal sector employment in Mexico is enrolment in the
pension system IMSS. In 2001, there were 12.4 million Mexican workers enrolled in
IMSS, and their number was forecast to rise to 13.1 million in 2003, or about 350,000 a
year (Estudios Económicos y Socio-Políticos de México). Thus, about 30 per cent of the
18 million Mexican-born workers with formal sector jobs are in the US.
Migration has been the major relationship between Mexico and the US for most of the
twentieth century, and Mexican migrants were negatively selected, that is, those who
left Mexico had less education and skills than the average Mexican (Martin 1993). The
movement of Mexican migrants to the US has often led to tensions that, on some
occasions, slowed economic integration. For example, successive Mexican governments
complained about the poor treatment of Mexican citizens in the US, and the nationalism
engendered by attacks on the US is one reason why Mexico has refused to open its
nationalized oil industry to foreign (US) investment. A standard treatment of Mexico-
US relations until the 1990s is entitled ‘Distant Neighbours’, reflecting the lack of a
common vision, and a common Mexican saying has been, ‘Poor Mexico, so far from
God, so close to the US’.
History helps to explain why Mexico-US migration may have slowed economic
integration. There has been Mexico-US migration throughout twentieth century, but
only during two periods, 1917-21 and 1942-64, were there formal bilateral agreements
to regulate the employment of most of the Mexican migrants in the US. At the
beginning of World Wars I and II, US farmers were able to persuade the US
government to make ‘exceptions’ to immigration rules to admit Mexican guest workers,
and both guest worker programmes ended after pressure from US labour and civil rights
groups, who argued that the Mexican migrants depressed wages and increased
unemployment for similar US workers.
Both guest worker or Bracero programmes were followed by illegal Mexico-US
migration, as especially rural Mexicans dependent on rain-fed farming learned to go
north for higher wages and more opportunities. At first it was very easy to cross the
border—the US Border Patrol was not established until 1924, after the first Bracero
programme ended. The Depression led to ‘repatriations’ of Mexicans to free up jobs for
Americans, and practically stopped Mexico-US migration, and there was little Mexican
migration north during the 1930s, the era in which midwestern Dust Bowl farmers
moved to California hoping to start anew. They found instead large and labour-intensive
factories in the fields that were accustomed to paying relatively low wages to seasonal
workers who were available when needed, and John Steinbeck’s 1940 novel, The
Grapes of Wrath, gave an emotional impetus to the common economic prescription of
the time, viz., break up large farms that needed armies of seasonal workers and were
viable only if they paid workers seasonally.7
There was a great deal of sympathy for structural changes in farming to reduce the
employment of seasonal workers, but low farm wages had been capitalized into higher
land prices, and landowners unwilling to see land prices fall used the outbreak of World
War II to win a new Bracero programme (Craig 1971; Martin 1996: Ch 2). During
WWII, Braceros, prisoners of war, interned Japanese, and state and local prisoners were
farm workers, and their presence in the fields sent an unmistakable signal to US farm
workers: economic mobility would require occupational and often geographic mobility;
getting ahead in the US labour market would require getting out of the farm work force.
After WWII ended, the Bracero programme expanded. Farmers assumed that seasonal
workers would continue to be available at US minimum wages, and they expanded the
production of labour-intensive crops as the baby boom increased demand for fruits and
vegetables, water became available to expand irrigated farming, and the interstate
highway system lowered transportation costs between the west coast, which produced
40-50 per cent of fruits and vegetables, and the east coast, home to most consumers. The
growth of labour-intensive agriculture in areas dependent on Braceros reflected both an
expanded western agriculture and the displacement of eastern farmers. California
became the number one farm state in 1950, and displaced New Jersey as the garden
state supplying fruits and vegetables to eastern population centres.
The Bracero programme ended in 1964, amid predictions that labour-intensive
agriculture would shrink in areas that had been dependent on Bracero workers, and that
processing tomatoes and other commodities that had been picked by Braceros would
have to be imported from Mexico. These predictions—by farmers and agricultural
researchers—proved to be false. Farm wages rose sharply. Cesar Chavez and the United
Farm Workers (UFW) won a 40 per cent wage increase for grape pickers in 1966,
increasing their wages from US$ 1.25 to US$ 1.75 an hour in the UFW’s first contract.
In response to this rise in wages, there was a wave of labour-saving mechanization, and
there were predictions that the US seasonal farm labour market would soon be like
construction labour markets, offering high hourly wages when seasonal work was
available, and maximum unemployment insurance benefits when there was no work
(Martin and Olmstead 1985).
Mexico-US migration was low during the late 1960s and early 1970s, and US farm
workers had their ‘golden age’, with many in California employed under union contract
and earning wages double the minimum wage. However, some of the ex-Braceros had
become US immigrants—during the 1960s, a US employer could issue a letter asserting
that a foreigner was ‘essential’ to fill even a seasonal job, and a foreigner could use this
offer of employment to become an immigrant. Some ex-Braceros became immigrants in
this manner, and the immigrant visa, printed on a green card, made them green-card
commuters—Mexicans who worked in the US seasonally, and then returned with their
savings to Mexico.
As these green-card commuters aged, many sent their sons north, using false or altered
green cards, or simply entering the US illegally. A smuggling infrastructure soon
evolved to move rural Mexicans to rural America, and this infrastructure was
strengthened markedly by an attempt by the UFW, the dominant US farm worker union,
to win 40 per cent wage increases in 1979, when wage-price guidelines called for
maximum 7 per cent wage increases. Labour contractors hiring unauthorized workers
broke many of the strikes, and competition between union hiring halls and labour
contractors to supply seasonal workers to farmers were generally won by the8
contractors. The number of workers under UFW contract dropped from 60,000-70,000
in the early 1970s to 6,000-7,000 by the mid-1980s (Mines and Martin 1984).
Mexico-US migration rose in the early 1980s with peso devalutions that made work in
the US more attractive. One crude indicator of illegal Mexico-US migration—
apprehensions of Mexicans just inside the 2000-mile Mexico-US border—reached their
all time peak of 1.8 million in 1986, meaning that the US was apprehending an average
an average 3 Mexicans a minute, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. In 1986, two events
occurred that, contrary to expectations, led to first more Mexico-US migration, and
eventually closer economic integration:
−   the US enacted the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 to
prevent illegal immigration by imposing sanctions on US employers who
knowingly hired unauthorized foreigners.
−   Mexico changed its economic policy from import substitution to export-led
growth.
Both policy changes increased Mexico-US migration. IRCA included two legalization
or amnesty programmes—the theory was that Mexicans and other unauthorized
foreigners who had developed an equity stake in the US should be integrated, not
deported. However, the legalization programme for unauthorized farm workers—the
Special Agricultural Worker (SAW) programme—was rife with fraud, and wound up
allowing over one million Mexican men to become US immigrants. There were only
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Source:  National Agricultural Workers Survey (available at: www/dol.gov/dol/asp).9
about six million Mexican men in rural Mexico in the mid-1980s, and the SAW
programme gave one-sixth of them immigrant visas. However, their families were
deliberately excluded from the SAW programme, under the theory that SAWs would
commute to seasonal farm jobs as green card commuters. (Martin 1994). The SAWs did
not behave as expected. Many quickly left the farm labour force, moved to California
cities where their families joined them, and were replaced by unauthorized workers in
the fields.
US-trained economists achieved political power in Mexico and, under President Carlos
Salinas, Mexico proposed the North America Free Trade Agreement in 1990, after the
Canada-US Free Trade Agreement went into effect in 1989. In an ironic twist, the major
opposition to NAFTA turned out to be in the US, where Ross Perot won 20 per cent of
the vote in his 1992 campaign for president in part predicting that NAFTA would lead to
a ‘giant sucking sound’ of US jobs moving to Mexico. Despite strong opposition from
Perot, US unions, and environmental groups, NAFTA entered into force on 1 January
1994.
4 NAFTA and the migration hump
NAFTA lowered barriers to trade and investment in Canada, Mexico, and the US, and
was expected to spur job and wage growth in the three member countries. Most of the
benefits of this freer trade were expected to accrue to Mexico, and most of the
adjustments to freer trade were also expected in Mexico. The most frequently cited
study of NAFTA’s likely effects concluded that Mexican employment, which was
projected to be 30 million in 1995, would be 609,000 or two per cent higher because of
NAFTA. Mexican wages were projected to be 9 per cent higher with NAFTA, largely
because foreign investment (and Mexican money staying in Mexico) was expected to
raise the value of the peso relative to the dollar, reducing Mexican living costs
(Hufbauer and Schott 1992: 47-64).
Virtually all studies agreed that most of the additional jobs due to NAFTA would be in
Mexico. Some anticipated displacement in Mexico, and predicted additional migration,
in part to urge the US and Mexican governments to create a North American
Development Bank to create jobs in rural Mexico. For example, Hinojosa and Robinson
(1991) estimated that NAFTA would displace about 1.4 million rural Mexicans, largely
due to changes in Mexican farm policies and freer trade in agricultural products, and
projected that 800,000 of those displaced would stay in Mexico, and 600,000 would
migrate (illegally) to the United States over 5-6 years. Hinojosa-McCleery (1992)
developed a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) and sketched three migration
scenarios. In 1982, they estimated there were 2.5 million unauthorized Mexicans in the
US, the cost of migrating illegally was US$ 1,200 (smuggling costs and lost earnings),
and the US earnings premium was US$ 3,000 a year (US$ 4,000 a year in the US, and
US$ 1,000 a year in Mexico). Their migration scenarios: no more unauthorized Mexico;
US migration; four million Mexican illegals, and five million Mexican illegals. They
thought the middle scenario could be achieved with a guest worker programme (what
they called managed interdependence).
Martin (1993) examined NAFTA’s likely impacts on Mexican and US agriculture
because most Mexican-born US residents came from rural areas in Mexico, and most10
had their first US job on farms. After examining how demand-pull factors in the US
would evolve after NAFTA, as well as supply-push factors in Mexico and networks that
enabled Mexicans to find US jobs, he concluded that the flow of Mexicans to the US,
running at 200,000 settlers and one to two million sojourners a year in the early 1990s,
would likely increase by 10 to 30 per cent for 5 to 15 years, producing a migration
hump. However, Mexico-US migration should then decline for demographic and
economic reasons. If a US demand-pull for migrants persisted even after Mexico-US
migration slows, migrants could come from Central America, China, or elsewhere—
there has been a sharp upsurge in Central American migrants in rural America. The
Clinton Administration used the migration hump to argue that Congress should approve
NAFTA because the additional migration—the hump—was a reasonable price to pay in
the short run for less Mexico-US migration in the long run.
The migration hump is pictured in Figure 1, where the solid line represents the
status  quo migration flow and the broken line depicts a migration hump, with the
volume of migration on the Y-axis and time on the X-axis. Economic integration leads
to an increase in migration over the status quo trajectory, and this additional migration
is represented by A. However, economic integration also speeds up economic and job
growth, so that migration falls and the volume of migration returns to the status quo
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5 Trade theory and the migration hump
The critical policy parameters are A, B, and C—how much does migration increase as a
result of economic integration (A), how soon does this hump disappear (B), and how11
much migration is ‘avoided or saved’ (C)? Generally, three factors must be present for a
migration hump: a continued demand-pull in the destination country with economic
integration, an increased supply-push in the origin country as a result of economic
integration, and migration networks that can move workers across borders. Comparative
statics—before and after equilibrium points—usually ignore the process of adjustment
to freer trade, and assume that trade is a substitute for migration in the short and long
term. The migration hump, by contrast, is a short-run relationship between migration
and economic integration.
Standard trade theory allows trade and migration to be complements when basic
assumptions, including identical production technologies; factor homogeneity; constant
returns to scale; instantaneous adjustment; and perfect competition, full employment,
and complete markets, are relaxed. For example, if a country in the North (N) is capital
rich, and a country in the South (S) is capital poor, the two countries share the same
technologies or production functions, and the same two factors of production, capital
and labour, are used in each country to produce two goods, free trade means that each
country will export the good that is more intensive in the factor that is relatively more
abundant—Country N will import labour-intensive goods from Country S, and
Country S will import capital-intensive goods from Country N.
Stolper and Samuelson considered the effect on factor prices (wages and the return on
capital) of an import tariff that increases the domestic price of the import-competing
good relative to that of the export good. Under the Heckscher-Ohlin assumptions, plus
the assumption that the underlying trade pattern is not altered by the tariff, an import
tariff increases the real reward of the relatively-scarce factor and lowers the real reward
of the other factor, or a tariff levied against labour-intensive imports in Country N will
increase Country-N wages. Migration in response to international wage differentials
means that protectionism in Country N should increase migration from the South, or the
protection of capital-intensive industries in the South should spur emigration. Trade
liberalization, on the other hand, shifts the production of labour-intensive goods to
Country S and capital-intensive goods to Country N, which in turn puts upward pressure
on Country-S wages, discouraging emigration.
However, if there are technology differences, trade and migration can be substitutes.
Corn in Mexico has been highly protected; a guaranteed price of corn that was twice the
world price was the social safety net in rural areas but, despite 2-4 million corn farmers,
75,000 corn farmers in Iowa in the mid-1990s produced twice as much corn, at half the
price, as Mexican farmers. The US produced about 10 times more corn than Mexico
and, using herbicides and other capital inputs, can export corn to Mexico and undercut
Mexican farmers, who use labour-intensive production methods. The Mexican corn
example illustrates the fact that, if the basis for trade is differences in technology, trade
and migration may be complements, as e.g. trade in computers and software is
accompanied by the migration of computer specialists.
Factor productivity differences between countries are one reason to trade, but reasons
for productivity differences can help to explain migration behaviour. Suppose Mexican
workers are more productive in the US than they are in Mexico because of better public
and private infrastructure. In such cases, migration can complement trade, as occurred
when much of the Mexican shoe industry moved from Leon, Mexico to Los Angeles,
CA in the 1980s—shoes produced with Mexican workers in Los Angeles were exported
to Mexico. Migration, by converting less productive Mexican workers into more12
productive US workers, in this case discouraged the production a labour-intensive good
in Mexico, and encouraged migration to the US.
A third assumption of the standard trade model is that (identical) production functions
in the two countries exhibit constant returns to scale. However, if costs of production
fall as output expands, especially in US industries that employ Mexican migrant
workers, economic integration may expand US production, thereby increasing the
demand-pull for migrants. This means that, when the basis of trade is economies of
scale, migration and trade can be complements.
The fourth assumption of the standard trade model is that adjustments to changing
prices and wages are instantaneous, and the process of adjustment does not affect the
comparative-static equilibrium. With economic integration, workers are often displaced,
but it may take time for them to find new jobs. For example, freeing up trade in corn
may displace Mexican farmers, but there may be few jobs created by economic
integration in the areas in which they are displaced. Furthermore, the new jobs created
via economic integration may hire different types of workers than were displaced, as
when older men are displaced from corn farming, but border-area maquiladora factories
that expand with integration hire mostly young women. If the displaced Mexican men
have better network connections and opportunities in the US labour market than in other
Mexican labour markets, there may be more migration with more trade.
The fifth assumption of trade theory is that markets are perfect; there is full information,
no risk, and no transactions costs. The new economics of labour migration is based on
relaxing this assumption, showing that, for example, a family with a migrant abroad
may experiment with a risky new crop, knowing that there will be remittances if the
crop fails. Similarly, remittances that enable some families to buy TVs may encourage
others to send a migrant abroad so that they can keep up with the neighbours.
6 Mexico-US migration in the 1990s
The fact that relaxing the assumptions of the standard trade model can allow trade and
migration to be complements, especially in the short term, is well appreciated, but there
has been less effort to determine how much additional migration there is or is likely to
be with economic integration. Mexico-US migration rose in the 1990s with closer
economic integration, and this section outlines Mexico-US migration patterns and
reasons for the upsurge in the 1990s.
NAFTA went into effect 1 January 1994. There was an immediate political crisis in
Mexico, as Zapatista rebels launched an armed campaign in the state of Chiapas. In
March 2002, the leading presidential candidate was assassinated. In an effort to bolster
the new candidate, the Mexican money supply was increased sharply in the run-up to
July 1994 elections, enabling President Ernesto Zedillo to eke out a win over a very
strong challenges from candidates on the left and right.4
                                                
4 The Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) was in power from 1930 to 2000, and Zedillo received 49
per cent of the vote in 1994, the National Action Party (PAN) 26 per cent, and the Democratic
Revolution Party (PRD) 17 per cent.13
Many economists urged outgoing President Salinas to devalue the peso, which was kept
artificially high by the foreign portfolio investment pouring into Mexico, but Salinas
resisted, wanting to be the first outgoing president to not devalue the currency.
However, in December 1994, just as Zedillo was being sworn in, Mexican and foreign
investors began converting pesos into dollars at the fixed 3.45 to US$ 1 rate, Mexico ran
out of reserves to support the peso, and the peso fell to 6 to US$ 1 (in July 2002, it was
trading at 10 to US$ 1). The result was Mexico’s worst economic crisis in decades. In
fall 1994, there were 10 million workers in formal sector jobs (enrolled in IMSS); by the
end of 1995, there were 9 million. Apprehensions of Mexicans just inside the US border
surged: to 1.1 million in FY94; 1.4 million in FY95; 1.6 million in FY96; 1.5 million in
FY97; and 1.7 million in FY98. The Mexican economy began to recover in 1996, and
by 2001, the number of workers enrolled in IMSS surpassed 12 million, as both foreign
investment and trade increased sharply.
Much of the growth in Mexico during the 1990s occurred in maquiladoras, foreign-
owned plants in border areas that import components duty free, assemble them into
goods, and then export the goods; the value added in Mexico—wages and utilities—is
typically 10 to 20 per cent of the value of the finished good. The maquiladora or Border
Industrialization Programme was launched by the US and Mexico in 1965 to provide
jobs for ex-Braceros and their families that had moved to the border, and now had no
source of income.5 In line with its closed economy strategy of protecting local
industries, Mexico required that maquiladora goods be exported, and as the finished
goods entered the US, duty was charged only on the value added by Mexican assembly
operations.
The number of maquiladoras and their employment increased sharply after several peso
devaluations in the 1980s. There were 12 maquiladoras employing 3,000 workers in
1965, 600 employing 120,000 workers in 1980, 2,000 employing 472,000 workers in
1990, and 4,000 employing a peak 1.3 million workers in fall 2000—maquiladora
exports of US$ 53 billion surpassed oil as Mexico’s leading source of foreign exchange
in 1998. At the height of the maquiladora boom, when maquiladora workers were being
paid US$ 1.50 to US$  2 an hour (including benefits), the state of Baja California posted
signs on the border advising migrants attempting illegal entry saying: ‘Migrant Friend:
Don’t put yourself at risk. Baja Californians will give you a hand’.
Maquiladoras have been a major job-creating success, but they never created jobs for
ex-Braceros. The Braceros were young men, while most of maquiladora workers were
young women—over 60 per cent in 2000. Maquiladoras preferred to hire young women
from the interior who were getting their first job to men who had worked in the US, or
wanted to work in the US, believing that the young women were more likely to be
satisfied with repetitive assembly line work. Despite the preference for young women,
maquiladora workers have very high turnover. A maquiladora must often hire two
workers to keep one job slot filled, an annual turnover rate of over 100 per cent, which
many analysts attribute to uniform wages and benefits, that is, to monopsony employer
behaviour. Maquiladora wages in dollar terms in 2002 remain below 1994 levels.
                                                
5 Many Braceros moved to the border area to increase their chance of being selected. The US employer
had to pay transportation from the workers’ place of recruitment to the US job, and employers thus
preferred border-area workers.14
During the late 1990s, the Mexican economy and Mexicans migrated northward with
maquiladora expansion. It is very hard to sort out cause and effect between economic
integration and Mexico-US migration. Clearly, the economic integration symbolized by
maquiladoras drew many Mexicans to the border area, but there is little smoking gun
evidence of a trampoline effect or stepping stone migration, in which internal migrants
to border areas become international migrants. The clearest smoking gun involves the
100,000+ indigenous Mexicans, Mixtecs and Oaxacans from southern Mexico, who
were recruited to work in Mexico’s export-oriented vegetable industry in the northern
part of the country. Their jobs end in the spring, just as the demand for farm workers in
the US increased, and some of them continued on to the US. One survey of Mixtec
workers in the US in the late 1990s found that two-thirds had worked in northern
Mexican export-oriented agriculture before arriving in the US (Zabin et al. 1993).
7 Mexico-US migration in the twenty-first century
The migration hump has both an up and a down side. Many pessimists look at the 1990s
upside of the Mexico-US migration hump and see only continued Mexico-US
migration. But Mexico-US migration may fall faster than expected for demographic and
economic reasons. As a result, the US border control build up may be completed just as
Mexico-US migration begins to fall for other reasons, and enforcement may get the
credit that demography and economics deserve.
Mexico’s population of 100 million is growing by 2 per cent a year. In the late 1990s,
legal Mexican immigration was 150,000 to 200,000 a year, and unauthorized Mexico-
US migration was even higher. Mexican population growth rate peaked at 3.3 per cent
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in 1970, but in 1974, the Mexican government launched a family planning programme
that helped birth rates to fall sharply: fertility dropped from an average 7 children per
woman in 1965 to 2.5 by 2000. Declining fertility reduces migration directly and
indirectly, because households with fewer children tend to keep them in school longer,
reducing the need for jobs for young people entering the labour market, and educated
Mexicans are less likely to emigrate.
Mexico has a major job creation challenge, but the number of persons turning 15, the
age of labour force entry in Mexico, is projected to drop by 50 per cent between 1996
and 2010, from about one million a year to 500,000 a year. According to the IMF, there
is a 2-1 relationship between economic and job growth in Mexico, that is, 2 per cent
economic growth is associated with 1 per cent job growth. The IMF includes all types of
employment, and thus uses an employment base of 30 million, so that each 1 per cent
job growth increases employment by 300,000, including 100,000 formal sector jobs. If
Mexico can achieve its economic growth target of 6 per cent a year, then the declining
additional workers and rising additional jobs X-curve will cross sometime in the next
few years. The next challenge would be to upgrade jobs and wages.
8 EU enlargement and migration
The EU is expanding eastward, planning to accept as members up to 13 eastern and
southern European countries—ten in the so-called first round(s)—Cyprus, Czech
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia—
and then perhaps three more—Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey. Since wages are lower
in the ‘accession countries’, migration to the current 15 EU countries from these new
entrants is expected to increase.
Just as with economic integration in North America, accession to the EU effectuates
economic, political, and institutional changes that are most pronounced in the poorer
countries. When estimating how much additional migration could result from EU
enlargement, changing institutions can make predictions of migration effects invalid, the
so-called Lucas-critique of projections of large-scale change. Lucas noted that, if there
are changes in institutions, then it is hard to extrapolate from past large-scale changes,
so that using the experience of integrating southern European nations may be
misleading if applied to from Eastern European nations.6
There have been many attempts to project the additional migration due to EU
expansion. Some are based on how individuals making rational decisions about wage
and unemployment differences would respond to migration opportunities, with
projections based on aggregate models, while others rely on opinion polls that ask
people about their migration plans. The surprise is that, regardless of methodology, the
models reach similar conclusions—3 to 4 per cent of the residents of the 10 first-round
                                                
6 Some researchers try to overcome this fundamental methodological problem by the inclusion of so-
called country-specific effects in their models, using a country-specific intercept that remains constant
over time. However, it is hard to define such an intercept for Eastern European nations when assessing
the effects of freedom of movement, since they have had no historical experience of free migration for
decades, and because East Europeans have not had freedom of movement rights in the EU.16
East European nations may migrate west within a decade of freedom of movement.7 In
most models that include Bulgaria and Romania, half of the migrants are projected to
come from Bulgaria and Romania, which makes it less likely that they will be among
first-round entrants, and thus not likely to achieve freedom of movement quickly.8 It
should be emphasised that the 3 to 4 per cent migration is a gross estimate—most
studies expect half of the migrants who move west to return to their countries of origin
within a decade, so that net migration would be 1.5 to 2 per cent. The bottom line is that
a 3 to 4 per cent gross migration from Eastern Europe would increase the population of
the EU 15, about 376 million, by about 1 per cent gross, or four million, and 0.5 per
cent net, about two million.
Given these projections, and past unfounded worries about south-north migration from
Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal with EU enlargement, why did Germany and Austria
take the lead in arguing that freedom of movement from Eastern Europe should be
restricted to avoid ‘too much’ immigration?  One criticism is that eastern European
nations are not similar to southern European nations. For example, eastern European
nations are poorer: southern European nations such as Greece, Portugal and Spain had
per capita incomes that were about 2/3 of the EU average, while the ten Eastern
European nations have per capita incomes that are 1/3 of EU levels. This means that,
even if economic growth in Eastern Europe is faster than in the EU-15, as projected in
most studies, it may still take 40 to 50 years for per capita incomes to converge. Austria
and Germany insisted that the EU not grant freedom of movement rights to nationals of
newly entered Eastern European nations for at least two years (2005-06, if they enter in
2005). After this two-year wait, the current 15-EU members could, under the freedom of
movement compromise, individually prevent migration for another three years (2007-
09), and then a further two years, for a maximum seven-year wait (2010-11). Eastern
European candidates for EU membership eventually accepted this 2-3-2 freedom of
movement plan.
9 Conclusions
International migration has great potential for disrupting orderly relations between
nations, despite the fact that the number of migrants is relatively small. In a world of six
billion, the number of international migrants rose sharply in the 1990s, and led to efforts
to reduce immigration in Europe by, inter alia, preventing the entry of asylum
applicants, and to reduce welfare costs associated with immigrants in the US by
restricting their eligibility. All the industrial democracies increased expenditures on
immigration control, and many joined regional forums to discuss migration issues.
With trade as a substitute for migration, economic integration should reduce
economically motivated migration. However, in the short run, migration and trade can
increase together, producing a migration hump when migration levels are viewed over
                                                
7 One of the most quoted studies of potential migration from Eastern European countries estimated that
335,000 workers from all of Eastern Europe would migrate west the first year of freedom of
movement. After this migration hump, the number of migrants would shrink to 160,000 a year by
2010, with 80 per cent of the migrants moving to Austria and Germany (Boeri and Brucker 2000: 15).
8 The ten are Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak
Republic, Slovenia.17
time. The US attempted to reduce Mexico-US migration with trade, and NAFTA went
into effect in January 1994 in part to enable Mexico to export tomatoes, rather than
tomato pickers. However, during the 1990s, Mexico-US migration increased sharply.
Mexican economic growth was very uneven, economic integration added jobs for new
labour force entrants, not those displaced by trade, and the US economy boomed,
providing a demand-pull for Mexicans with US contacts.
High levels of Mexico-US migration between 1995 and 2005 should not obscure the
fact that migration may soon diminish for demographic and economic reasons. A
combination of the sharp drop in Mexican fertility in the 1980s and 1990s, economic
and job growth, and the near completion of the exodus out of agriculture should reduce
Mexico-US migration after 2005, just when the US build-up along the border is nearing
completion. If this occurs, analysts must be careful to credit the demographic and
economic factors that reduce migration pressure, not the border controls whose
completion happened to coincide with diminished migration flows.
The migration hump has three major policy implications. First, economic integration
should be advocated as the best long-run policy to promote ‘stay-at-home’ development,
but not sold as a short-term cure for unwanted migration. Second, there is a need for a
better understanding of adjustment processes under economic integration, so that
increases in migration can be anticipated and dealt with in a manner that does not slow
increased trade and investment. Third, emigration countries that benefit economic
integration could be expected to help manage the migration hump in light of the
resistance to free trade in many ageing industrial democracies worried about unwanted
immigration..
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